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Abstract 
In response to Krasner's view, exclusively focused on geopolitical tensions and power games on the world 
stage, Keohane’s counter-multilateralism approach brings a solution: that of cooperation. The fact remains 
that the explanation delivered by international relations overlooks the fundamental role of law. Currently, the 
BRICS legal policy presents itself as a paradigmatic model, which shows how Krasner's and Keohane's 
theories complement one another, thanks to their targeted use of international law. This paper aims to 
demonstrate that the BRICS — in defining an innovative and independent legal policy influence normativity 
processes — are a post-hegemonic construction, with their own normativity, intended to fight against the 
organized hypocrisy of our international system. In view of the question of how the BRICS participate in the 
moralization of capitalism, I have considered the hypothesis of a BRICS hegemony, in the sense that the 
forms of cooperation promoted by the group are innovative and are not corresponding to any concept 
currently in force: the group uses WTO and WHO's health policies to curb world trade regulations. The main 
idea of this paper is to try to articulate the international relations theories with a legal analysis. In other 
words, my working assumption is that to be able to design its own normativity, the group diverts the WTO's 
political and legal mechanisms, via the WHO's health requirements, and is, therefore, rising as a new 
hegemonic formation. 
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Resumo 
Em resposta à visão de Krasner, focada exclusivamente em tensões geopolíticas e jogos de poder no 
cenário mundial, a abordagem do contra multilateralismo de Keohane traz uma solução: a cooperação. 
Agora a explicação fornecida pelas relações internacionais desconsidera o direito como guardião da 
arquitetura do sistema internacional. Atualmente, a política jurídica do BRICS apresenta-se como um 
modelo paradigmático que mostra como as teorias de Krasner e Keohane se complementam, graças ao 
uso direcionado do direito internacional. Este artigo pretende demonstrar que os BRICS - na definição de 
uma política jurídica inovadora e independente - influenciam os processos normativos. Argumento que os 
BRICS são uma construção pós-hegemônica, com normatividade própria, destinada a combater a 
hipocrisia organizada de nosso sistema internacional. Considero os BRICS como uma forma de 
cooperação inovadora que não corresponde a nenhum conceito atualmente em vigor: o grupo usa as 
políticas de saúde da OMC e da OMS para conter as regulamentações do comércio mundial. A ideia 
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principal deste trabalho é tentar articular as teorias das relações internacionais com uma análise jurídica. 
Em outras palavras, a minha hipótese é que, para ser capaz de projetar sua própria normatividade, o grupo 
desvia os mecanismos políticos e legais da OMC, por meio dos requisitos de saúde da OMS, e está, 
portanto, surgindo como uma nova formação hegemônica. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Normatividade; OMC; OMS; BRICS; Shift Focus; Contra Multilateralismo. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE URGENT NECESSITY TO RECONSIDER HEGEMONY 
 
Between nationalisation and neo-colonisation, the issue of hegemony — ever since 
Gramsci — has fuelled the debate on international relations. This leads us to argue that 
international economic relations do not only derive from the guiding principles of States, nor are 
they solely determined by the dynamics of capital. Power has become a central issue, and we are 
gradually shifting from a restrictive approach to a softer one, based on Keohane and Nye's model 
(2001). Since the 1990s, the intelligentsia has largely questioned the State's deconstruction, and 
the decline of State-centrism has pointed towards more democratic governance in the 21st 
century (HAGGARD; SIMMONS, 1987). The United States, as the ultimate victor of WW2, were 
able to influence modern-day international relations, to build a form of hegemony tacitly accepted 
by all (KEYLOR, 2003). So, although the concept of hegemonic power is not, per se, necessarily 
malevolent, the abuse of dominant position certainly is. The paradox of this undeniably multipolar 
projection is that, at the same time, the 2000s have shown the scale of international dis(order) due 
to all-too-long accepted US dominance (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013). Yet today, can we still assert 
that State and Power are synonymous?  
A hegemon is ontologically a guide and, as specified inter alia by Gilpin, it is supposed to 
ensure the provision of several goods, including access to health, because this serves its own 
interests and goals of power (KOHLMORGEN, 2007). Hegemony describes how a dominant 
power sets out the premises of a desirable order in universal terms and presents them as a 
system that benefits everyone (KINDLEBERGER,1981). Conversely, according to Cox (1983), 
hegemony is formalised within a set of standards, institutions and universal procedures, which lay 
down the basic rules of behaviour applicable to States, as well as transnational social forces; sort 
of guiding principles that support the dominant mode of production. The analyses of both 
Gramsci and Hirschman reconcile these two approaches and shine a light on the BRICS reality, in 
so far as it addresses the issue of regional hegemony. In the face of an ever-changing 
international society, the BRICS model of alternative cooperation illustrates this new manner of 
developing a world society, away from North-South, South-South and East-West approaches or 
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even from the allegedly 'universal' ones of international organizations (IOs) (WEBB; KRASNER, 
1989). 
With the subprime crisis, IOs have undoubtedly been overwhelmed by the world society's 
intricate interdependencies and interactions and with the BRICS nations, it is the very perception 
of relations between regionalism and multilateralism that has changed radically (ACHARYA, 2004). 
Although the acronym was coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001, the BRICS model itself only 
emerged five years later, through the commitment of the States concerned. Considered as a 
genuine institutional innovation, the BRICS rest upon no legal ties, and are rather the result of a 
voluntary association of States through the pooling of their interests to conduct balanced 
international trade relations. By definition, the BRICS nations are not an IO and are also decidedly 
different from a regional organization: they are, by nature, geared only toward cooperation, rather 
than integration. As their initial financial objective was rapidly exceeded, the BRICS are now a 
sound co-operative entity, grouped around world trade regulatory issues, which illustrates the 
need of genuine counter-multilateralism to cope with hegemonic abuses and, more broadly, 
modern legal frameworks' lack of efficiency in meeting the emerging needs of our societies 
(SHRADDHA, 2016; KEOHANE and MORSE, 2013). In addition to the present state of 
international law, there is another aspect to be considered: the BRICS national economies have to 
solve a similar entanglement: Their will to be major players within international trade comes up 
against significant national health challenges (SILVA, 2014). The group's four main members are 
experiencing problems related to,  
1. the health protection of their citizens in the absence of adequate funding 
mechanisms; 
2. the spread of infectious diseases;  
3. drugs.  
No doubt that the BRICS are a pioneering force: their institutional uniqueness and 
substantial innovation are redefining the governance model (NOGUEIRA, 2012), but how can the 
BRICS legitimately uphold these three common issues? Their legitimacy is based on fulfilling their 
commitments, in a political sense. It is, after all, through the strength of their actions and 
decision-making that the BRICS will have a lasting impact on the world stage. The group's final 
goal remains to 'contribute to a fairer world trade' but, considering that the interplay of power 
within the WTO is almost impossible to outflank in the event of direct action, the BRICS will 
bypass the problem raised by Krasner (2004), and thus fully illustrate the counter-multilateralism 
model, in the vein of Keohane's regime shifting model (KEOHANE and MORSE, 2013).  
The challenge of health policy compliance is fundamental for the group as a whole, since 
each State has strong national interests in solving its public health issues (KOHLMORGEN, 2007). 
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Incidentally, such issues are part and parcel of trade policy regulations. Indeed, public health 
concerns within world trade development have been included in the WTO agreements since the 
Uruguay Round negotiations (OMS, OMC, 2002). As a result, as much the TRIPS, the GATS, as 
some of the trade-in goods agreements provide for exceptions to the Organization's rules when it 
comes to complying with several health requirements. The WTO's interpretation of the WHO's 
principles is worth noting in two areas: the protection of living species through the adoption of 
trade measures, which avoid causing them harm; and support for the recognition of intellectual 
property rights that guarantee the proper use of natural resources and/or the protection of said 
resources and species. Yet, the inclusion of provisions related to the protection of public health 
within WTO agreements — although 'universal' — has proved to be insufficient from 2001, at 
least as evidenced by the Doha Development Agenda. It seems that the WTO's texts are too 
vague to satisfy the WHO's expectations. It appears that the financial and technical support 
driven by WTO-WHO institutional cooperation is more of a palliative than an offer of tangible aid. 
Against this backdrop, and guided by a substantial twofold benefit, the BRICS nations will define 
themselves as those who transform economic growth into better health. They will first boost 
funding policy, combined with reinforcement of technology, as well as a transformative change in 
institutional cooperation and technical support, acting simultaneously within the WHO and the 
WTO.  
In response to Krasner's view, exclusively focused on geopolitical tensions and power 
games on the world stage, Keohane’s counter-multilateralism approach brings a solution: that of 
a genuine cooperation. Indeed, although the WHO and the WTO move towards institutional and 
legal cooperation, their commitments seem to be insufficient to meet the BRICS needs. Although 
now the traditional fora of international law are no longer the only ones that can claim hegemonic 
practices, the fact remains that the explanation delivered by international relations overlooks the 
fundamental role of law, as the custodian of the international system's architecture. Currently, the 
BRICS legal policy presents itself as a paradigmatic model, which shows how Krasner's and 
Keohane's theories complement one another thanks to their targeted use of international law. 
Given the indisputable decline of the efficiency and, by extension, the legitimacy of classical IOs, 
and considering that the BRICS, following the announcement of the creation of the New 
Development Bank in 2014, are now seen as a genuine alternative to existing power relations, the 
question then arises: how does the group achieve its original purpose of a 'fairer world trade'? In 
other words, and to factor in a more legal analysis — unfortunately all-too-often overlooked — 
one needs to determine whether there is a normativity inherent to the BRICS. My working 
assumption is that to be able to design its own normativity, the group diverts the WTO's political 
and legal mechanisms, via the WHO's health requirements, and is, therefore, rising as a new 
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hegemonic formation. The BRICS will turn their weaknesses in the health field into an asset to 
permeate world trade law, by developing a tripartite legal policy focused on national health policy 
reform:  
1. set up a national health-insurance system for their citizens;  
2. fund new technologies to eradicate the most lethal infectious diseases;  
3. fight against drugs, including tobacco, through monitoring schemes and 
information campaigns.  
This paper aims to demonstrate that the BRICS — in defining an innovative and 
independent legal policy — influence normativity processes. Based on the counter-multilateralism 
model, we current IOs are losing their legitimacy while the BRICS logic opens new pathways and 
setting up a shift focus (KEOHANE and MORSE, 2013). Soon after defining this sectorial pathway, 
the group will acquire a certain legitimacy, and operates a shift focus, using the vital topic of 
international health. As a knock-on effect, it has an impact on WTO law: the instrumentalization of 
WHO's health policies to curb world trade regulations seems to be the only way for the BRICS to 
meet their goal of a ‘fairer world trade’. Doing it so, the group will increase its legitimacy on the 
world stage (CASHWELL, 2014). Indeed, while recognising the crucial existence of WHO and 
WTO, the BRICS nations are defining a normative framework for and by themselves, 
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the classical subjects of law and how useless they are for 
current international relations.  
We argue that the BRICS are a post-hegemonic construction, with their own normativity, 
intended to fight against the organized hypocrisy of our international structure, such as Krasner 
qualified the international system. The BRICS pathways consist of defining a threefold sectorial 
and legal policy modelled on the WHO's requirements and their own domestic interests 
(KEOHANE, 1989 and 2002; KRASNER, 2001). By using ‘fuzzy law’, the BRICS will strengthen 
their commitment to enshrine health policies in international trade practices (I), but it is with the 
optimisation of soft law that they will contribute to the creation of a genuine right to participate (II), 
whereby each member State may defend its interests without having to submit other members to 
their own will (KEOHANE and MILNER, 1996; KRASNER, 1985 and 2001). 
 
 
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FUZZY LAW: CONSTRUCTION OF A PRE-NORMATIVITY BY THE 
BRICS ENGAGEMENT 
 
In a world dominated by the opposition between hard law / soft law, the BRICS inversely 
acts upon this duality by translating its political interest into a sort of fuzzy law. This concept 
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presents itself as an alternative of quasi-legality allowing to better consider the creative dynamics 
of the relations between law and politics (PEREZ, 2015). Fuzzy law is a proper legal qualification 
of the legal policy practices of non-subjects of international law. Kind of pre-soft law, the fuzzy 
integrates the vague and random dimension of contemporary international law considering the 
normativity of the pre-juridical acts.  
Separating itself from the strict obligation approach in order to make political law prevails, 
BRICS sets the scene for what became later the prelude of soft power and they elaborated on the 
modes of its right to participate in the international system. The use of fuzzy law is important in 
our study as it helps to understand the positioning of the BRICS vis-à-vis the ongoing failing IOs 
and, more importantly, it helps to give sense to the development of its health policy integration 
strategy to world trade practices. Indeed, the BRICS lays the groundwork for its necessity even 
before the drafting of legal acts. It is therefore through its active engagement that the BRICS will 
ensure its breakthrough as an indispensable player in the renewal of international law. Fuzzy law, 
or law of elaboration, as used by BRICS, translates action into diplomacy, swinging between 
structuring at an international level (A) and acting by transgression on the current global order 
through the creation of its own global legal entities (B). 
 
2.1. THE BRICS STRUCTURING ACTION BY ARTICULATING THE PROMOTION OF NATIONAL 
FUNDING, R&D AND CLAIMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AT AN INTERNATIONAL 
LEVEL 
 
In her speech at the first meeting of the BRICS Health Ministers, the WHO DG Stated:  
 
I am personally convinced that the BRICS countries are the ground on which the 
real impact of the diseases will be demonstrated. (…) I also believe that the 
economic cost of these diseases may be such that it negates the so-called 
benefits of modernization and economic growth. (ACHARYA, 2014). 
 
In response, the Beijing declaration focused on the cardinal health-trade relationship for 
the Group and set out its ambition to fight infectious diseases. To implement this broad objective, 
each BRICS member has developed a national policy for financing research and development in 
the health sector and more specifically on the prevention aspect, thus becoming a vital vaccine 
producer. Instead of funding medicines in the strictest sense of the word, or initiating legal actions 
before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the national BRICS allegations are based on the 
violation of the TRIPS, and the BRICS States opted for a prevention policy, competing against 
superpowers, especially the United States, since the beginning: yet the bias is to have a larger 
production of made in BRICS vaccines, and, therefore, a higher number of patents for these 
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countries (YU, 2008; BARTSCH, 2007). The BRICS preventive strategy, which makes BRICS be a 
post-hegemonic power, is to divert the current institutions and not to oppose to the powers 
already established. In this way, the group ensures:   
1. a constant and consistent financial benefit and is, therefore, an alternative to the 
traditional mechanisms of international financing; 
2. an increase in patent rights and therefore the assertion of its power within the WTO 
and more broadly in world trade;  
3. a certain legitimacy both on the international scene and on the part of civil society 
BRICS. 
Power games as presented by Krasner invite indeed to avoid confrontation in favour of 
cooperation. But, as Keohane emphasizes, cooperation makes sense if and only if the coalition of 
States that is behind it acts in response to a system failure. The diversion of the institutions in 
place is more advantageous than the struggle against the contemporary hegemonic powers, 
whether they are primary or derived legal subject of law. The BRICS is gradually becoming a 
necessary player in that it supports, apparently, the philosophy of the IOs. Thus, as an example, if 
the Gate Foundation has long ensured the financing of the R&D sector, today, it is thanks to the 
proactivity of the BRICS and the financing support of Brazil and India that the WHO can continue 
to carry out its health mission and, even more, develop new policies. The WHO, in one of its 
communiqués, expresses that "for investment in the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis in 
low- and middle-income countries, it is almost $ 2 billion $) out of the $ 8.3 billion needed in 2016. 
This deficit will worsen by 2020 if current levels of funding do not increase” (http://www.who.int). 
Since 2011, the date of the first meeting, and so far, the action and policy of WHO are still widely 
recognized and praised, as if to insist on the merits of its existence. The fundamental role of the 
Organization is constantly being recalled and, logically, the importance of preserving its existence 
and functioning as a body for the management of health policies is regularly reiterated. However, 
the BRICS also reports its commitment to continue to contribute to the Organization's policy, 
developing new solutions to achieve MDG 4 (CRESWELL, 2014). In each of its Statements, the 
group recognizes the importance of the UN-Nations institutions but, at the same time, stresses 
their limit: without the action of the group, how could these institutions continue to implement 
strategies for the eradication of infectious diseases? The BRICS uses a de facto situation that, in 
itself, is synonymous with vulnerability: the management of infectious diseases at the national 
level is impossible. It is then by pooling their health interests, guided by an economic ambition, 
that BRICS members succeed in reversing the interdependence - dependence on International 
Organizations and big States powers to establish themselves as the power of resolving difficulties 
(KICKBUSCH, 2014.) 
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BRICS is posed to being an unwavering innovative support to aging IOs. In 2014, the 
group’s policy becomes more straightforward, more aggressive: the tone is set to no longer 
recognise the existence of the WHO but instead to affirm the strong undisputed role the group 
plays within the UN architecture. Furthermore, two events support this new policy: on the one 
hand, holding the first Meeting of the Science, Technology and Innovation Ministers committee 
that shows the will of the group to be at the forefront, thus separating itself from the International 
Organizations. On the other hand, there has been an explosion of vaccine production worldwide. 
It is by positioning itself as a non-threatening actor and by implementing WHO policies that 
BRICS establishes its status as a legitimate entity, bordering on the accepted criteria of a legal 
entity. The Organization will acknowledge in a recent Statement that: 
 
the five countries had taken important initiatives in the area of vaccine technology 
development and had greatly improved their national regulatory capacity (...), the 
results show that The BRICS group has had a major impact on the price and 
availability of vaccines, and this impact is largely attributable to the production of 
Indian vaccine manufacturers (OMS, 2016).  
 
For the BRICS, quality seems to rhyme with quantity: in 2016, a study pointed out that 
Chinese researchers have created the first vaccine in the world against hepatitis E. From 2015, 
the BRICS will expand its field of action, setting itself up as a defender of global health crises by 
mentioning the serious concern that constitutes Ebola. Beyond the human and social aspect, 
through the recognition of its intellectual property rights, finding a vaccine against Ebola would 
ensure the BRICS a status of international financial and commercial leader. The structuring action 
of the group is the corollary of a form of normative recognition: the lever financing-of-the-policies-
WHO is finally only a sesame to easily penetrate the forum of the WTO and to effectively and 
efficiently modify the regulation of world trade, the issue of intellectual property being a priority or, 
in a way, a pretext. By positioning itself as a non-threatening actor and effectively implementing 
WHO policies, the BRICS establishes its status as a legitimate entity. From there, it will gradually 
assume a place of first choice on the international scene. 
 
2.2. BRICS ACTION BY TRANSGRESSION THROUGH THE CREATION OF A GLOBAL LEGAL 
ENTITY 
 
The various communiqués from the BRICS Health Ministers provide three basic pieces of 
information for the development of our thesis: first, it is announced that the BRICS, in view of the 
importance of the MDGs, will actively develop the implementation of policies in these territories, 
notably through the establishment of Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Sectorial national politics 
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and group policy are inseparable but by managing to pool their interests: the BRICS States 
become the leader in the field of public health. Secondly, the commitment to respect the 
provisions of TRIPS is reiterated, concerning the provisions on greater flexibility for developing 
and least developed countries (ODELL; SELL, 2006). By this second point, the BRICS presents 
itself as a spokesman for States in difficulty or, at least, for States not integrated into the WTO. 
The Organization was created in a certain way by the action of the negotiating groups. In the 
Uruguay Round, the cause of developing countries and LDCs was mainly championed by Cairns 
and the ACP (NARLIKAR, 2004). The WTO is, in a way, permeable to the actions of groups of 
States. Finally, it is more widely the action of the WTO and the WHO which is praised as regards 
the evolution of the discussions on the regulation of access to medicines. This last point then 
confirms the strong and unwavering link between trade and health, recognizing the viability of the 
BRICS health strategy to better influence the regulation of world trade (SHELEPOV, 2018).  
The pathway of the BRICS consists in the development of a triple sectorial legal policy 
modeled on the requirements of the WHO and on its own national interests: using the fuzzy law, 
or right of definition, the BRICS will strengthen its commitment to integrating health policies into 
international trade practices. For instance, the WTO-WHO institutional cooperation in the field of 
access to drugs has evolved since the creation of BRICS: in 2001, both organizations held a 
Symposium on price regulation in order to enhance the access of troubled countries to drugs and 
in 2013 the WIPO joined them. The different topics of the Symposia dealt with the question of 
innovation, the warhorse of BRICS (CHAKRABORTY, 2006; DREZNER, 2015; FRASER, 2014). 
Beyond this inspiring action, the media notes of BRICS illustrate how their actions and the G20 
action are in synergy, making the UN-Nations group a mere site for holding a meeting, as if the 
modes to achieve a legal entity should change as well (GAUTIER, 2014). Somehow, it is as if 
BRICS would be trying to create a form of global legal entity playing, both on the internal and 
external aspects through the multiplication of meetings in international organizations. By 
optimizing the use of soft law through the manipulation of fuzzy law, the BRICS will contribute to 
the creation of a real right of participation, or else right of elaboration or definition, where each 
State member can defend its interests without having to submit the will of others. The BRICS 
does not constrain, it brings together. Far from the classic strategy of subordination of State 
interests, the BRICS acts according to a dynamic of sharing interests while respecting the 
sovereignty of each. This practice ensures coherence between the development of a national 
sectorial policy and the construction of a legal policy of the group (GRAY; MURPHY, 2013; 
GRUBER, 2000). 
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3. THE OPTIMIZATION OF SOFT LAW: POIÈSISOF NORMATIVITY BY THE BRICS ACTION 
 
The WTO, before being a normative and jurisdictional body, is a forum of negotiation. The 
WHO, by the way, is also based on the negotiation – law-making mechanism. It is therefore by 
definition that these Organizations are led to use soft law, a kind of rule of attenuated authority 
describing behaviours that its author wishes to see adopted by its addressees, in order to 
coordinate the actions of (States) in society and to promote their cooperation (NYE, 1990; 
CHATZISTAVROU, 2005). Soft law is a different constraint from hard law and if IOs resort to this 
type of norms, it is above all to avoid jeopardizing State sovereignty (CULOT, 2005). The BRICS, 
by its structure, out of bounds of the definition of subject of law, will resort alternatively to the use 
of hard law and soft law, on the one hand, because this last type of norms assures him a certain 
legitimacy, and, secondly, because soft law, in that it is linked to soft power, makes it possible to 
increase the field of competence of the BRICS, and thus its effectiveness (FOOTER, 2010).  
BRICS, as a mere actor, can create a real participation and non-subordination right, which 
confers to soft law actions a real legal scope (ABBOTT; SNIDAL, 2000). To carry out its legally 
ensured power game strategy in which each member receives an equivalent space to participate 
in the creation of the law, BRICS will contribute to reinforce the hard law ≈ soft law 
interdependence, using a soft power avenue. It is by implementing the exceptions envisaged by 
the WTO and WHO that BRICS will show that hard law requires, to come true, soft power 
infrastructures. The actions of BRICS concerning the law, given that it is a simple implementation 
of conventional dispositions, illustrate that hard law and soft power (A) complement each other, 
and the soft power ≡ soft law progression is illustrated through the orientation of the WTO judicial 
policy by means of the WHO sectorial policy (B). 
 
3.1. THE HARD LAW ≡ SOFT POWER COMBINATION: THE BRICS ACTION CONCERNING THE 
LAW, A SIMPLE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTIONAL DISPOSITIONS THROUGH THE 
SURVEILLANCE CENTRE 
 
In WTO law, both the Agreements on Trade in Goods, the TRIPS and the GATS contain 
explicit exceptions to the liberal requirements of the Organization (GAUTIER, 2014). Trade barriers 
are acceptable practices to the extent that they are intended to protect the consumer and that 
their merits are scientifically verified. Hard law can take two forms: principles to be followed or 
exceptions to be respected, depending on whether one is in the sphere of WHO, whose object 
relates to public health, or the WTO, whose business purpose must consider public health 
requirements. Given the same objective, the two Organizations employ different aspects that are 
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complementary to this type of normativity. But the variation in the drafting of conventional 
standards further hampers the possibilities of guaranteeing their respect (KOHLMORGEN, 2007; 
KRASNER, 1982). Yet, and this is precisely what was illustrated in the case DS26: EC-Hormones, 
where, by appealing to the Codex, the EU has highlighted the limits of hard law. At the same time, 
it is the suppletive and yet essential dimension of soft law that has been focused on. Moreover, 
by this mention, it is the importance of the consensus mechanism that has been devoted, 
conferring, with strong anticipation, the added value of a governance orchestrated far from the 
institutional rigidity of the post-WWII system.  
Considering, that Brazil is the third-largest tobacco producer and exporter country, only 
after China and India and ahead of Russia, and, that FIOCRUZ will take the initiative in this regard, 
the tobacco issue is of utmost importance for the creation of the legal and political strategies of 
the group (THORSTENSEN, 2012). Because the BRICS nations will finally allow for the 
implementation of WTO and WHO conventional norms, the integration of health policies in the 
world’s trade law is meaningful and active. During the October 2015 meeting held in Moscow, the 
BRICS Health Ministers, in order to materialize the Article 5.3. of the WHO Framework 
Convention, and to enforce the decision FTC/COP3(7) of 2008, decided to establish, in their 
respective territories, Surveillance Centers or Observatories for the tobacco industry, so that 
measures can be taken to limit the launching and the proliferation of this kind of products. The 
first of the five BRICS nations to be actually engaged was Brazil, with the creation of FIOCRUZ in 
2016, whose initiative was largely welcomed by the DG of the WHO. A great part of FIOCRUZ’s 
action is to come up with judicial policies aimed to counter the action of certain nations that are 
heavily dependent on the tobacco industry (OMS, 2016). The Centre has, thus, elaborated a 
policy including judicial decisions, and is poised to confirm that, oftentimes when a national 
lawsuit takes place, States use the WHO Framework Convention as an excuse in order to dismiss 
the allegations of the industries. Apart from playing a simple influential role, BRICS greatly 
contributes to the international architecture from an institutional point of view: due to its 
intervention, it is considered both autonomous and proactive a group. Facing hard law that is 
often considered vital, and soft law envisaged as a necessary mode to enforce conventional law, 
it seems that BRICS has opted again for the third way, using soft power as a transition between 
these two aspects of the normativity. 
 
3.2. THE SOFT POWER ≡ SOFT LAWPROGRESSION: ORIENTING THE WTO JUDICIAL POLICY 
BY USING THE WHO SECTORIAL POLICY IN A BRICS FASHION 
 
Rather than opting for the median jurisdictional confrontation of the DSB, the BRICS 
prefers an approach of misappropriation of legal mechanisms in the strict sense of the term. The 
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members of the group will play the subtle nuance between will and interests, constituting a third 
party in certain disputes of the DSB, thus giving substance to their strategy of creating a real right 
of participation. Indeed, if, because it is not a subject of law, the participation of the BRICS as 
such in the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO is impossible, it remains that its 
participation fragmented, in the strict framework posed by third-party status, constitutes a means 
of action. The creation of supervisory bodies for the tobacco industry thus constitutes a bridge 
between hard law, with undeniable obligation, and soft law, which is illustrated by the various 
communications and documents published by the BRICS to notify his will. This institutional 
gateway is in itself an act of soft power, focused both on the implementation of the provisions of 
hard law and a directed use of soft law acts. 
By the creation of FIOCRUZ, in Brazil, after the meeting of ministers of health in Moscow, 
the issue of tobacco and related industrial policies, because they threaten compliance with Article 
5.3. of the WHO Convention, constitute the basis for the development of a WTO-oriented judicial 
policy (RICUPERO et. al, 2012). In 2010, a few years before the creation of FIOCRUZ, the Clove 
Cigarettes dispute between the United States and Indonesia opened. Brazil reserved its third-
party rights as soon as the panel was formed. By that time, he was the only BRICS country to 
have come forward. Its jurisdictional approach cannot then be interpreted as a guarantee of an 
informal representativeness of the interests of the group, but only as the expression of own State 
interests; of his will. Considering, on the other hand, that Brazil is the third-largest producer and 
exporter of tobacco after China and India, and before Russia, and on the other hand, that it will be 
the initiative FIOCRUZ, the tobacco issue is of considerable importance in the elaboration of the 
group's legal, political and health strategies. If the BRICS has been directly involved in setting 
WHO's sectorial policy, it may be that, as a decisive player in the tobacco market, the practice of 
policy control industrialists in this field would help them gain legitimacy: by integrating and 
implementing WHO's health policy, the Group stands as an example to be followed, and not as a 
threat, thus damaging the pioneering hegemonic in place. 
Where Krasner saw irreducible tensions power games, soft device by Keohane and Nye 
can understand that if the BRICS manages to win, it is by diverting the mechanisms of struggle: 
the law is no longer useful from now on to guarantee the application of the norms but it serves to 
legitimize new geopolitical behaviours. In 2010, i.e. some years before the creation of FIOCRUZ, 
the Clove Cigarettes Dispute between the United States and Indonesia took place. Brazil has 
reserved its rights as a third party ever since the special group was set up. At that time, it was the 
only BRICS country to have spoken out. Its jurisdictional approach cannot be interpreted as a 
token of an informal representation of the group’s interests, but only as an expression of its own 
interests. After the creation of FIOCRUZ, as the tobacco issues and the related industrial policies 
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might threaten the enforcement of Article 5.3. of the WHO Convention, they become the basis of 
the development of a judicial policy implemented within the WTO framework, given that BRICS 
prefers a diversion of jurisdictional mechanisms. The most flagrant case of manipulation of judicial 
policies has recently been illustrated with Australia. In 2011, the country adopted a plain 
packaging law; the reaction of Imperial Tobacco Australia, British American Tobacco Australia 
and Philip Morris Limited was not long in coming and in 2012 Australia had to answer for its 
legislation in a national court. More surprisingly, the WTO has had to decide on the legal-political 
consequences of this national dispute: since 2012, 5 complaints have been lodged against 
Australia with the OSD on the grounds that its legislation violates Articles 1, 1: 1, 2: 1, 3: 1, 15, 16, 
20 and 27 of the TRIPS Agreement and Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the WTO 
treaty provisions recognizing public health as a fundamental element in the development of world 
trade law. Even more surprisingly, Brazil, Russia, India and China constituted third parties in the 
said disputes and yet only Brazil presented its arguments only in the context of DS 434 and 458, 
arguing in the one and the other case that: 
 
in order to meet the substantive requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, the 
request for the establishment of a panel must identify the measures targeted in 
the dispute and contain a brief summary of the legal basis of the claims + add on 
the reasoning of the parties (DS434 - 15, §3.21 & 458-18, §3.23).  
 
The concordance between the opening of the consultations of these disputes with the 
WTO, the reservation of the rights of the third parties of the BRICS, the decision of the Australian 
judge, and the creation of the FIOCRUZ enjoins to conclude to a strategy of judicial policy on the 
part BRICS. By acting as guarantor of the FIOCRUZ program and by becoming a third party in 
disputes relating to the tobacco issue, the BRICS - the median manifestation of Brazil - ensures 
the implementation of the WHO Framework Convention within the World Health Organization.  
Indeed, although the rights of third parties are limited by its argument, Brazil makes it clear that its 
objective is to ensure the continued existence of FIOCRUZ, the DSB being used as a judicial 
mechanism to guarantee the project. Thus, the WHO-linked soft power structure FIOCRUZ 
provides the basis for Brazil's soft law claims under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
If the legal subjects of international law are no longer the only ones capable of claiming a 
hegemonic practice, the fact remains that, in order to form the basis of a paradigmatic reflection 
on the future of the BRICS, this must be accompanied by a legal approach. However, this aspect 
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has often been abandoned in favor of a strictly political analysis of the group's action. While it is 
undeniable that the BRICS is revolutionizing governance through the redefinition of the 
fundamental concept of power, it is in international law that its impact is most striking, as the 
group acts as a catalyst of normativity. The creation of soft power structures ensures the 
implementation of hard law, which enables to guarantee the scope of the group’s soft law 
actions. Likewise, BRICS challenge IOs efficiency: it highlights their inability to also use soft 
power to ensure the enforcement of its own conventional regulations. Using this strategy BRICS 
becomes a necessary actor for the survival of IOs and, paradoxically, the biggest threat for their 
future. Thus, in view of the question of how the BRICS participates in the moralization of 
capitalism, I have considered the hypothesis of a BRICS new form of hegemony, in the sense that 
the forms of cooperation promoted by the group are innovative and not corresponding to any 
concept currently in force while the coalition is dominating, step by step, the current global order. 
BRICS presents itself as a guide to the international society, but at the same time, each member 
insists on maintaining control over its national resources and the area of the world that it 
dominates. 
BRICS made a genuine redefinition of the fundamental concept of power which 
revolutionized governance (ALDRIGHI, 2009; BORBA CASELA, 2011). Since then, power is 
defined through the triptych: financial sovereignty - strong and solid technological development - 
sectorial economy. BRICS practice also leads to a redefinition of power plays (HURREL, 2009). 
So, if state-centrism is no longer current, it is a fact, however, the role of the State remains 
central: it was only the definition of the State that changed, insofar as it is now exclusively linked 
to that of capitalism. Since the subprime crisis, it has been about making capitalism moral, clean 
and transparent. Now, considering that this is the new objective of the international society, this 
means that until then capitalism was dirty, obscure and immoral. Therefore, beyond the 
redefinition of forms of governance, BRICS cooperation forms part of a new era; an era dedicated 
to the purification of capitalism. And if the challenge seems to be of Marxist inspiration, it is not, 
however, incompatible with today's neoliberal practice: ambition is, in effect, to convert capitalism 
into morality. It is not about destroying it but all purity is cruelty, and in the present case purifying 
-capitalism would be to suppress the mechanism of surplus-value. The BRICS tries to respond to 
the demand to cleanse capitalism. Neoliberalism is moving towards the end and the hypotheses 
of post-hegemony are only partially illuminating. BRICS cooperation presents itself as the 3rd 
long-awaited path: far from neoliberalism and socialism, the BRICS incarnates the original will 
that animated the creators of this famous “third world”. Because, in fact, at the beginning of the 
Cold War, the Third World was not the expression of a stigmatization, reflecting rather the will to 
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create an alternative to the two blocs. The third world was, therefore, the incarnation of the third 
possible way.  
To think of the BRICS, which has questioned the whole architecture of the international 
society since WWII, is, therefore, to think of the exit of an East-West / North-South sclerosing 
opposition. By recognizing the fundamental existence of classical IOs but by substituting their 
normative framework on its own, the BRICS demonstrates their inefficiency. Therefore, there is a 
BRICS normativity built on a triple logic interpretation - explanation - modification of the law in 
order to ensure its domination of the political game. The law is no longer a guarantee of the 
current world order: it becomes an instrument at the service of a real and deep change. Although 
the BRICS was initially formed to ensure "a fairer world trade", the expansion of its scope has 
continued since the Yekaterinburg and Fortaleza Summits, making the question of the regulation 
of health policies an influencing tool and /or argument to curb WTO Law. It is by misappropriating 
the median WTO law that BRICS succeeds in redefining normativity. In response to the 
ontological legal crisis, classical IOs are the most endangered and tend to be imperialistic, going 
beyond the original function of the hegemon-guide to make it a hegemon-dominus. By proposing 
alternatives of governance oriented using health policies and making innovative use of WTO law, 
the BRICS revives with the first conception of the hegemon, a guide working for the common 
good, without losing sight of the realization of its own interests.  
Highlighting the complementarity between the approaches of Keohane and Krasner, we 
can thus consider that the counter-multilateralism of Keohane, in that he interprets the 
mechanisms of State coalition as consubstantial to the realization of a true cooperation, brings a 
track of answer to the vision of Krasner, which consists of an explanation of the State of the 
median international relations the power games. The BRICS have made their State weakness a 
decisive asset and although the legality of the instruments used is questionable, the fact remains 
that their use allows the group to upset the criteria of normativity accepted until then. So, 
because BRICS assertion of hegemonic power involves cooperation, and to mark the semantic 
difference from the overly connoted concept of hegemon, we propose to now call the BRICS 
Hegemon Operationis, posing the hypothesis that this new form of regulating international 
relations would be the way to make capitalism moral. 
 
 
 
* Artigo recebido em 11 de agosto de 2019,  
aprovado em 13 de novembro de 2019. 
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